National security agencies and other interested parties now often regard conflict as the inevitable consequence of climate change. This inclination to reduce war to the vicissitudes of climate is not new however. Here I examine some of the earlier ways in which violence was attributed to climatic conditions, particularly in the United States, and trace links between these older advocates of climatic determinism and the recent writings of those insisting that climate change will usher in a grim world of chronic warfare. It ends by drawing attention to the writings of some critics who are troubled by the ease with which climatic reductionism is capturing the public imagination.
INTRODUCTION
'Climate Change will lead to an increased threat of war, violence and military action against the UK and risks reversing the progress of civilisation'. 1 So readers of the Guardian newspaper were told on 6 July 2011, on the authority of Chris Huhne, then
Britain's Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. In recent years the idea that climate change should be treated as a major player on the world's national security stage has gripped the public imagination, even if, as Halvard Buhaug recently pointed out in the pages of this journal, current 'quantitative research on climate and conflict' has demonstrated that 'the two phenomena are not connected in the simple and direct manner' that is often claimed. 2 Certainly the idea that climate change breeds conflict is a refrain echoing its way through the recently--published book lists, 3--5 and has featured prominently over the past decade and more in a range of prominent government--orientated reports by political analysts and policy makers. 6--8 In most of these narratives the tragic history of humanity's future is reduced to the vicissitudes of climate's reign. Global warming, we are told, will mean a falling food supply, and that means famine, death and war. Here climate is writing a script that stars Malthus and Hobbes as the leading dramatis personae: exceed the world's climatically--determined carrying capacity and countless millions live a life that's nasty, brutish and short. The result will be a profoundly differentiated world -the fault--line mostly running along a north--south divide -rife with violence and conflict.
A sense of necessitarian inevitability weaves it way through many of these scenarios.
Hunting for connections between warfare and climate is not a new pastime, however. To the contrary; it has a long genealogy. Revisiting something of this history, I contend, is illuminating inasmuch as distance enables us to see with particular clarity the ideological investment frequently exhibited by proponents of the idea that war may be reduced to matters of climate. It may also enable us to discern resonances between traditional climatic determinism and contemporary climate change reductionism. By perusing the earlier prosecution of climatic historicism, moreover, the moral components of climate--warfare nexus are exposed with particular clarity. The ways in which some of these earlier advocates of climatic determinism could absolve history of ethical accountability by reducing war to weather invites us to ponder whether a similar anaesthetizing of moral responsibility might not be present amongst some contemporary proponents of climate reductionism.
CLIMATE AND CONFLICT: CONFIGURING CONNECTIONS
The idea that climate and conflict are causally connected can be traced back at least It is not difficult to discern the appeal of climatic destinism. It delivered explanatory simplicity, political self--justification, and ethical absolution. 
DISSENTING VOICES
The fashion for reducing war to climate has had a remarkable resurgence in recent years stimulated in part by the proclivities of funding agencies and the priorities of national governments. Not least is this the case with national security agencies. As Empirical inquiries like these, which challenge the assumption that climate and climate change are prime causes of violence, raise troubling concerns about the ease with which an ideology of climate reductionism has infiltrated its way into national security consciousness. 41--42 Critics of this determinist turn, and particularly of the Malthusian assumption that increased environmental scarcity and migration 'weaken states' and 'cause conflicts and violence,' express grave concerns about the lack of attention devoted to ascertaining 'the ways that environmental violence reflects or masks other forms of social struggle' 43 and about the too comfortable means by which 'forms of technological engineering … reduce "solutions" to matters of purely technical concern'. 44 For one thing such scenarios take outbreaks of violence as merely the natural consequence of social--evolutionary adaptation.
Climate reductionism thus facilitates the sense that war can be readily 'naturalized and depoliticized' in markedly similar ways to earlier climatic readings of the American Civil War. As one group of researchers observe: 'Some studies in environmental security are in danger of promulgating a modern form of environmental determinism by suggesting that climate conditions directly and dominantly influence the propensity for violence among individuals, communities and states.' When analysts 'neglect the complex political calculus of governance' and the remarkable ways in which human societies actually do cope with challenging environments, they reach 'conclusions that are little different from those ascribing poverty to latitudinal location or lessened individual productivity to hot climates, as was common in European and American scholarship about a century ago'. 45 
CONCLUSION
In his celebrated Walden, first published in 1854, David Henry Thoreau declared 'Our life is frittered away by detail … Simplify, simplify'. 46 That dictum, it might be said, has been adopted by many over the centuries who have reduced war to the vagaries of climate. Now it is capturing the imaginations of national security agencies, mass media pundits, and the military. The payoffs of course are considerable. For if war can simply be attributed to the state of nature -to the empire of climate -then, as
John William Draper realised a century and a half ago, humanity is well--nigh absolved the responsibility of seeking political solutions to climatic challenges.
